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In this paper, I delineated the dynamic processes of political awakening of workers, 
industrialists, and bureaucrats when faced with a rapid socioeconomic change. The 
Meiji Japan was a labor surplus economy in which the balance of power belonged 
to the owners of the scarce capital and land resources, not to the owners of 
abundant labor resources, the workers and the tenant farmers. Thus, their 
grievances were dealt with as an economic problem. Even the workers themselves 
were not conscious of their right to a decent human life. However, the advent of 
large-scale wars contributed to the advancement of the bargaining power of the 
workers, especially with skills in high demand. The tightening of labor market 
empowered the skilled workers in their demand for higher wages and better work 
conditions. Consequently, Japan experienced a bulge in real and nominal wages 
as well as the change in consumption patterns. The modern managerial 
industrialists managed to link higher wages with higher productivity and larger 
profit. Yet they failed to grasp the rights of wage laborers as being equal to theirs. 
In this respect, the Japanese middle class failed to sustain the trend toward 
democratization. Although being the prime mover of democratization, the Japanese 
middle class remained hesitant to recognize the human rights of workers, the 
propertyless. Therefore, when they did manage to start a truly liberal reform, they 
found that the external factors hindered their effort toward the progress of 
democratization. It was their hesitation that brought the end to the liberal 
democracy which they initiated.
Key Words: Modern Japan, Labor as a Social Question, Surplus Economy, 
Political Awakening, External Factors. 
INTRODUCTION
A century apart, both England and Japan successfully achieved 
industrialization. However, unlike England in the eighteenth century, 
Japan made a conscious effort of industrialization at the national level1  
and transformed her predominantly agrarian society into a 
manufacturing one under the governmental plans. Yet in both cases, 
1 Slogans of the Japanese industrialization imply its determination. First, Bunmei Kaika, 
westernize Japan. Second, Shokusan Kogyo, industrial expansion and business development. 
Third, Fukoku Kyohei, wealthy country and strong army.
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factory town life disrupted village life and the people soon realized that 
they lost their old way of life. With the goodies of industrialization 
came the evils of the capitalism. Japan, being a late-comer, was well 
aware of this social disease and strove to avoid the mishaps England 
had to swallow. Supposedly, everything should be under control for 
Japan since she learned a lesson or two from England.
Unfortunately, Japan, too, had to undergo the torturous adjustment in 
dealing with tensions between newly created classes, namely 
industrialists and wage workers. The government could not trust 
industrialists on the matter of labor management because they lacked a 
long-term vision of economic growth. The businessmen would not let 
control over factory labor slip away from their hands: they portrayed 
themselves as the paternal masters to whom workers should turn for 
care, thus they were convinced that their ‘beautiful customs’ in 
managing workers were more effective in both boosting economic 
growth and avoiding European social disease than the governmental 
meddling. Consequently the government and the industrialists had little 
consensus on how to solve the new problem of labor. 
Faced with double jeopardy, the initial reaction from workers was 
apathy. Labor disputes were nothing more than riots to bring their 
plight to the attention of high-level personnel. Unlike their cohorts in 
England, wage workers in Japan were very late in becoming 
class-conscious. Or even worse, the first-generation labor force hardly 
felt attached to its job.2 A Dutch advisor at the Nagasaki Ironworks was 
so frustrated by the lack of discipline among workers that he had to 
make several requests to bakufu officials: 1) He wanted factory doors to 
be closed so that workers could not come and go freely during work 
hours, 2) demanded that those absent should be checked by a Japanese 
doctor to see if they were indeed sick, to name a couple.
 Unlike workers in England, Japanese workers were elbowed into a 
presumably wonderful urban life while holding on to old customs and 
values. Workers, after seeing the unnatural habitat, regarded their stay 
temporary and promised to themselves that they would go ‘home.’ 
Thus, their attitude remained lax toward work hours and holidays as 
well as rules pertaining to jobs. Furthermore, workers did not feel it 
necessary to challenge the unfairness of the treatment as long as their 
own skin was intact. When workers were not wholeheartedly 
2 Gordon (1985: 27). Interestingly, discipline of labor is considered the most important 
factor behind Japanese economic miracle nowadays. 
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committed to their jobs, they could barely develop a sense of common 
interest, if not obligation to fellow workers. It was only after they came 
to realize that they would never leave this new abominable 
environment when they shifted their sense of belonging from ‘home’ to 
the place of their stay and attempted to do something about their life. 
However, they were yet to be politicized. Their first organizational 
effort was in recreating the sense of community and security which they 
lost when they left ‘home.’
Consequently, the first labor organization was designed to provide 
mutual benefits, which is maintaining the status quo because workers 
reacted only to situations which worsened their living/working 
conditions. When a dispute occurred against an employer, workers 
relied on petitions or riots, if the former turned out to be of no effect. 
Basically, workers appealed to the moral responsibility of their paternal 
employers. The idea of ‘basic human rights’ was fundamentally foreign 
to them.3 Both workers and industrialists clung to ‘beautiful customs.’ 
Subtle obedience to one’s master constituted normal virtue in 
apprenticeship. Unlike workers in England, Japanese workers remained 
unwilling to challenge employers by utilizing political leverage, i.e. their 
organization. By the same token, unlike managers and owners in 
England, Japanese businessmen retained their image of a benevolent 
master commanding their apprentices’ absolute loyalty and opposed to 
workers’ organizational effort to better their lot. The Japanese 
government was active in the matter of labor-business relations not 
because of enlightened bureaucrats’ effort to protect workers but 
because of economic objectives. For the sake of orderly industrial 
development, the government persuaded industrialists to enlist the 
business cooperation in implementing social and economic policies.4 
This connectivity to the old value system accounts for the 
characteristics of the nature of labor relation from 1890s to World War 
I although much of the unique Japanese tradition and custom are 
claimed to survive until now.5 Except, perhaps, policy makers, workers 
and industrialists stubbornly clung to the traditional social values. Most 
industrialists obdurately refused to recognize the need to institutionalize 
labor movement. Vis-é-vis the government’s economic reason behind the 
protection of workers’ physical well-being, industrialists maintained that 
3 Ayusawa (1966: 53). 
4 Gordon (1989: 55).
5 Evans (1970: 125). In this context, the author argues that the Japanese model does not 
converge to the Western model. 
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their mystified customs of paternal care combined with workers’ 
absolute obedience were more effective in promoting productivity. Up 
to this moment, ideology did not play a significant role. Thus, class 
consciousness did not enter the mind of workers as well as industrialists.
It was the next generation who was born and/or grew up in the new 
industrial settings that became politically oriented. Kautsky correctly 
pointed out that only after a generation or two, the transition from a 
peasant to a worker was complete in that ‘home’ was no longer the old 
village.6 World War I was indeed a focal point in labor movement. It 
was over this period when various social strata came to be conscious 
of their own power or lack of power as a class. Japan was under the 
Imperial Democratic rule in which elite pluralism flourished along with 
the pluralistic structure of the political order. Around this period, the 
Japanese labor market underwent a transformation which would 
increase an average worker’s real income.
In this paper, I intend to delineate the dynamic processes of political 
awakening of workers, industrialists, and bureaucrats when faced with 
a rapid socioeconomic change. A particular attention is given to the 
transformation of the labor market. It is noteworthy that the Japanese 
government implemented social and economic policies not out of 
paternalism, but out of economic rationality.7 Consequently, the matter 
of workers’ right was never on the list of the governmental 
consideration, not to speak of the industrialists’ concern. However, 
business and the government were divided even within itself on labor 
problems at least until labor movement turned prominently radical and 
carried a flavor of socialism.
This paper will be divided into two periods: 1890s-World War I and 
post W.W.I-Pacific War. During the first period, labor relations 
epitomize on the issue of a factory law whereas a major concern lies in 
labor union law during the second period. For each period, I will 
analyze the conceptual and active responses of labor, management, and 
bureaucracy under separate headings. A special focus is given on the 
labor market because its transformation allegedly changed ‘the rules of 
the game.’8 
6 Kautsky (1972: 115). “Although it may take only a day objectively to turn a peasant 
to a worker, it is likely to take at least a generation for him to make the transition 
subjectively ...” 
7 Garon (1987: 19). An opposite viewpoint is presented by Iwao F. Ayusawa who 
argued that the Japanese government was compelled ‘to adopt social policies to mitigate 
the suffering of the victims of the revolutionary change’ (Ayusawa 1966: 54).
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THE MEIJI ERA 1: LABOR POLICY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1880~1900
With the demise of the feudal rule, the oligarchs initiated the Meiji 
Restoration. As their foremost goal was to modernize Japan, the 
adoption of new technology accompanied the introduction to new ideas, 
to much of the oligarchs’ dislike. Those who were against the ruling 
oligarchs seized upon this opportunity and provoked the movements of 
the popular rights. In order to contain such a growing movement, Ito 
Hirobumi and Okuma Shigenobu, two most prominent oligarchs, 
agreed on setting up a representative government. In 1889, the oligarchs 
presented the constitution modeled after German’s. Consequently, the 
constitution established the first national assembly, the Diet in 1890. The 
Diet was composed up of an appointive House of Peers and an elective 
House of Representatives. The lower House members were elected by 
male voters who were over twenty-five and paid taxes of at least fifteen 
yen per year were eligible to vote.9 This restriction on eligibility implied 
that the voters consisted of the landowners and the well-to-do ex- 
samurai. Consequently, the entire framework of legislation represented 
the conservative oligarchs’ effort to curb any challenge to their power 
as well as their interest.
The early economic structure was determined by the Japanese 
governmental policy to promote industry.10 As the initial state 
ownership of enterprises yielded to the budget pressures and losses 
from 1880 on, the Japanese government sold most enterprises to the 
private sectors and supported them, if not subsidized them. As a result, 
the size of the industrial employment doubled around 1890 as seen in 
Table 1. Industrial workers, however, remained a small proportion of 
the entire labor force.11 Accordingly, workers were not perceived to be 
worthy of consideration as a separate entity to the bureaucrats. 
Moreover, before 1900, the Japanese bureaucrats were hardly insulated 
from business interests because ex-bureaucrats often found themselves 
8 Napier (1982: 342). There are two theories to interpret the transformation of the labor 
market: 1) the W. Arthur Lewis’ theory of labor surplus development and 2) the 
neoclassical theory of competitive labor market.
9 Marsland(1989: 6). Of the 40 million Japanese people, about 450,000 were eligible to 
vote. 
10 Hazama (1976). 
11 Industrial employment was about 1 percent of the whole work force in 1886 and 2 
percent in 1900. Marsland (1989: 15).
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TABLE 1. INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN: 1886~1897
Source: Marsland, Stephen E. The Birth of the Japanese Labor Movement: Takano Fusataro and the  
Rodo Kumiai Kiseikai, p. 13.
a: 1886 and 1888 figures are for factories of ten or more employees.
b: 1892 figures are for companies with 1,000 yen or more in capital.
c: 1900 figures are different from 1897 figures in heavy industry so that the proportion 
increased to 13 percent, which corresponded to 59,000 out of 435,000 total employed. Other 
sectors shrank slightly.
d: glass-making, paper-making, weaving and cloth manufacturing, chemicals, brick-making.
in business and exerted their influence in policy making on behalf of 
business. Consequently, the Japanese government was reluctant to 
intervene in the labor relations, which were left with the industrialists 
to deal with. 
Following the Sino-Japanese War, industrialization accelerated 
changes in the labor market where supply of labor pool was no longer 
unlimited. As the skilled workers found themselves in high demand, 
they started to take advantage of their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
industrialists. Being unable to understand that high wage was also the 
driving force toward high labor productivity and eventually largerprofit 
to themselves, the frustrated industrialists attempted to do away with 
labor mobility.12 Along with high turnover, Industrialists were baffled 
with an increasing number of labor disputes and blamed the workers 
for becoming undisciplined. 
The worst was yet to come. Distrust of ‘invisible hand’ especially in 
labor market which business shared also led the government to take a 
keen interest in factory legislation. The Industrial Bureau of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce which handled questions of labor policy 
was hardly inclined to curb the employer’s power over labor. The sole 
12 Taira (1970: 86).
sectors
1886a 1888a 1892b 1897c
persons percent persons percent persons percent persons percent
silk-reeling 51,000 25 76,000 33 69,000 21 105,000 24
cotton-spinning 2,000 1 8,000 3 29,000 9 42,000 10
heavy industry 14,000 7 13,000 6 16,000 5 32,000 7
metals mining 35,000 17 40,000 17 106,000 33 120,000 28
othersd 105,000 51 94,000 41 104,000 32 136,000 31
total 207,000 100 231,000 100 324,000 100 435,000 100
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objective of the statist scheme was to nourish the favorable industrial 
environment by regulating labor mobility. In so doing, the 
governmental industrial policy as well as labor policy was supposed to 
benefit private enterprises. Thus, business largely favored such a 
regulatory legislation.13 It was the labor-protection feature of the factory 
legislation that irritated industrialists. Lacking a cross-cutting organization 
to represent business interest, industrialists relied on ties to the Diet 
politicians and relentlessly rejected the need for a protective factory law.
In the course of deliberation, industrialists opposed to the governmental 
intervention in labor relation for the following reasons: 1) since Japan did 
not yet experience Western-style social diseases, such a law was 
premature to apply, 2) Japanese employers were innately more 
benevolent toward their workers than the Western cohorts because of 
the ‘beautiful tradition of paternal relationship,’ 3) restrictions on 
working hours and child labor would lead to the increase in production 
costs and eventually damage the competitiveness of the Japanese goods, 
and 4) most of all, the traditional custom of ‘beautiful’ paternal care 
along with the obedience from workers would be more effective in 
avoiding conflict, maintaining stability and promoting economic 
development than any legal measure.14 
However, there was hardly a consensus within the government over 
the propagated economic benefits of protective labor policy. Failing to 
recognize that the problems of Japan’s ever expanding working group 
was more than an economic matter, bureaucrats and industrialists alike 
convinced themselves that industrialization was the best welfare policy 
a nation could offer. Consequently, the major concern of the 
government was a long-term economic growth. In this context, the 
government persuaded industrialists that the factory law was 
indispensable because protection of workers would upgrade the labor 
productivity and eventually pave the road for the orderly development 
of industry by preventing the Western social evils such as strikes.15 
13 Garon (1987: 20). In drafting a factory legislation, the Japanese bureaucrats consulted 
with industrialist groups closely, but never with the labor groups. In one instance, a local 
industrialist group petitioned the government for a law that would bind workers to 
employment contracts. In the first draft of 1883, tough penalties were stipulated against 
a worker who would break a contract or stop work on his own volition or engage in a 
conspiracy to do so.
14 Gordon (1989: 56). Industrialists felt largely humiliated by the government’s 
trespassing.
15 Gordon (1989: 55).
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Although bureaucrats agreed on the necessity of the long-term economic 
growth, they disagreed on the method, especially the legal measure 
such as the labor-protective factory legislation. Dissidents argued that 
the more direct way to pursue the long-term economic growth would 
be the rapid capital accumulation based on the low labor cost. In the 
meantime, the rising demand for labor would necessitate the 
improvement of working conditions.
The division within the government provided a breathing space for 
industrialists. They did not let a golden opportunity slip away and 
strenuously lobbied to dilute the protection features, and then block the 
presentation of the draft to the Diet. Coincidentally, the Okuma-Itagaki 
cabinet collapsed in 1898 right after the endorsement of the draft by the 
Higher Council on Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry. The draft of 
the factory act never reached the Diet. Moreover, the business 
community effectively persuaded the successive governments to delay 
the legislation for a decade. Given the absence of the industry-wide 
representative organization, industrialists reaped a fruit of their 
incessant efforts with a remarkable success.
The remaining group which should be a participant of all this 
process, yet left out of the decision making was workers. Aided by the 
regime’s aversion to the organized labor, industrialists insisted on the 
preindustrial control over labor relations.16 The disillusioned 
industrialists simply could not understand that calling a modern 
manufacturing factory a household would not secure worker loyalty. 
Nor would such propagation ameliorate workers’ grievances against the 
working conditions when work conditions in the factories were known 
to be inadequate.17 Coupled with their deprivation, workers felt 
helpless. Even the government was more concerned with accumulating 
wealth than creating a happy life for workers. After all, the individual 
welfare was hardly a matter of consideration. The sole recourse they 
could fall to was spontaneous strikes, which often ended with the 
dismissal and/or arrest of strike leaders and the unattained goal.
Under these circumstances, Takano Fusataro and a small group of 
intellectuals opened the Japan office of the Japan Knights of Labor, 
16 Evans, Jr. (1970: 111). “... Japan’s industrial leadership ... always chose to follow the 
patterns of Japan’s culture and history ...” 
17 Large (1981: 2). For example, in a Kobe match factory, the windows were built high 
along the walls so that rising phosphorus fumes could be removed without much good 
to workers. Still phosphorus caused the workers’ faces to become swollen and white. 
Lead dust also caused damage to the bronchial tubes.
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Shokko Giyukai, out of a humanitarian desire to help the workers relieve 
their grievances. Giyukai was devoted to education of workers about 
trade unionism. Consequently, in 1897, Takano and Katayama Sen 
formed the Association for Encouragement and Formation of Trade 
Unions, Rodo Kumiai Kiseikai, on the American Federation of Labor 
model whose federation structure encompassed trade unions.18 
Obviously, Takano had to modify the American approach to labor 
organization. Unlike the American tradition, the Japanese undermined 
efforts by individuals and groups on their own behalf. Therefore, the 
reason for change needed to be justified to benefit the entire nation. 
Takano correctly estimated that the modification should be genuine 
enough to command support from the prominent ideology in Japan 
while compromising enough to maintain the AFL financial support.
Two ideologies prevailed in the modern Japan: laissez-faire and state 
guidance. Many industrialists and some conservative bureaucrats 
favored laissez-faire on labor relations. However, their mystified 
‘beautiful’ tradition of paternal care turned laissez-faire into a predatory 
capitalism without the regulation on employers’ callous practices. When 
both workers and employers lacked experiences in handling labor 
relations under the new industrialization, state guidance was a 
reasonably favorable alternative. 
The Social Policy School was the prominent supporter of this ideology 
in Japan.19 Educated at the Verein fur Sozialpolitik (Social Policy School) 
in Germany, the founders of the Social Policy School in Japan rejected 
the neoclassical argument of an autonomous solution of labor problems. 
Most of all, the subhuman conditions under which workers were placed 
indicated that the present wages and working conditions were so 
inadequate that workers would be unable to support themselves as well 
as their offspring’s. Social Policy scholars insisted on a policy of 
state-directed social policy if Japan wanted to prevent workers from 
turning their bafflement into violent strikes, revolution, class conflict or 
even from toppling down the capitalist system itself. All social policy 
18 Marsland (1989: 53). Samuel Gompers, president of AFL inspired Takano while 
Takano’s stay in the United States. 
19 Marsland (1989: 56). It was founded in 1896 by intellectuals centering around Kanai 
En and Kuwata Kumazo, two prominent economics professors at Tokyo Imperial 
University. Takano Iwasaburo, Takano Fusataro’s younger brother, was also one of the 
founding members. He was a graduate student at Tokyo University and later played a 
matchmaker between the Social Policy School and Kiseikai. Intellectuals in the Social 
Policy School were Takano’s source of support, both politically and financially, in Japan.
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scholars agreed on the need for the governmental legislation of working 
conditions and wage. However, there was a considerable disagreement 
over the role of unionism in Japan.
Takano Iwasaburo pointed out that union would rectify the 
disadvantaged workers’ position against the employers. Workers were 
argued to reach consensus on their position through unions which 
would act as a mechanism for discussing the problems with employers. 
Then joint committees made up of representatives of workers and 
employers could resolve the conflicting matters. Many social policy 
argued against unions because unions could provoke radicalism and 
socialism. Being aware of the ideological climate in Japan, Takano 
Fusataro tried to find a middle ground between the AFL ideology and 
the Social Policy School ideology. First, higher wages would result in 
not only welfare of workers but also security of capitalism by 
maintaining the long-term supply of labor. Second, in so doing, higher 
wages would increase aggregate demand for goods, thus a more 
prosperous nation. 
The tough task was to find a middle ground on the method to 
achieve higher wages. Collective bargaining as well as state intervention 
were accepted as mechanism to pursue higher wages. However, unions 
could serve as institutions for worker education, self-improvement and 
mutual assistance other than collective bargaining.20 Kiseikai was a 
‘umbrella’ organization to promote unionism, a ‘trade union school’ 
rather than a union itself. Kiseikai also published a journal, Rodo Sekai 
(Labor World) under Katayama Sen as a chief editor. Just as union 
leaders avoided confrontations with employers, Katayama set the policy 
of the journal ‘not to engage in a divisive struggle against capitalists, 
but rather to perfect true harmony and cooperation.’21  
Ironworkers’ Union, Printers’ Union, and Japanese Railway Workers’ 
Reform Society were the most successful unions related to Kiseikai. The 
progress on labor organizations was made primarily in the new 
occupations where no prior workplace traditions existed. Equipped with 
the skills in high demand, these workers emboldened to seek 
enhancement of their life by wage increases as well as mutual 
assistance. Furthermore, an aggressive government armaments program 
called for an increase in employment in heavy industry as seen in 
20 Marsland (1989: 70). Takano’s thinking is well expressed in “A Summons to the 
Workers,” the pamphlet distributed to factory workers two months before the foundation 
of Kiseikai. 
21 Garon (1987: 17).
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Table 2. The government’s strategic expansion of the heavy industry 
created a shortage in skilled labor so that employers found it difficult 
to disregard unions completely. This change in bargaining position 
furnished workers with confidence that they would not lose their jobs 
or would have no problem in finding new ones elsewhere if they did. 
Knowing that the industrial boom created a labor shortage, yet seeing 
that employers strove to hold wages steady even when rice price rose, 
workers increasingly resorted to strikes whose number and intensity 
grew as seen in Table 3.
Although workers did seek higher wages and better working 
TABLE 2. EMPLOYMENT IN HEAVY INDUSTRY, 1893~1898
Source: Marsland, Stephen E. The Birth of the Japanese Labor Movement, p. 90.
* All figures are for workplaces of ten or more employees only.
TABLE 3. STRIKES, 1897~1898
Source: Marsland, Stephen E. The Birth of the Japanese Labor Movement, p. 92. 
* The only figures available are for second half of 1897 and for entire 1898.
year
total heavy industry percent of
industry private government total heavy industry
1893 297,100 9,800 9,600 19,400 6.5
1894 396,000 16,100 12,200 28,300 7.1
1895 435,800 16,800 15,300 32,100 7.4
1896 456,200 20,700 15,900 36,500 8.0
1897 460,200 15,300 16,800 32,100 7.0
1898 435,100 22,500 18,700 41,200 9.5
reason
second half 1897 1898
strikes workers strikes workers
wage increase 21 2,248 35 5,669
wage(other) 6 779 3 381
shorter hours 0 0 1 68
against foremen 1 155 0 0
about discharge 2 188 0 0
other 2 145 4 145
total 32 3,510 43 6,293
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conditions through strikes, they were also concerned with their social 
status and treatment by superiors which originated from the 
preindustrial era. For instance, the engineers and firemen of the Japan 
Railway Company staged the most spectacular strike, protesting the 
preferential treatment confined to salaried workers. In their pamphlet 
secretly distributed to JRC engineers, they wrote the following:
“... The next matter is the reform of names. ‘Drivers’ should 
become ‘engineers’, ‘driver’s assistants’ should become ‘engineer’s 
assistants’, ‘stokers’ should become ‘firemen’, and ‘clean-up men’ 
should become ‘janitors’. It is only natural for a driver, since he is an 
operative technician, to be called an engineer ...”22 
Blue-collar workers also opposed the discriminatory treatment such as 
their kneeling on the floor while an assistant stationmaster issued 
instructions on a chair. These were surely sufficient reasons for 
discontent, yet their disposition clearly indicated that their attitudes 
were not totally detached from the preindustrial era. Concerned with an 
unfavorable reaction of the company, blue-collar workers sent a petition 
to various station officers.
Although the strike brought overall benefit to blue-collar workers, it 
was not based on a signed agreement nor a contract. The company 
unilaterally determined the course of decision and never recognized the 
representative body of workers, yet workers did not feel it necessary to 
challenge such an arbitrary decision. The workers’ apathy caused an 
eventual downfall of three unions along with Kiseikai. First, they refused 
to pay their dues to unions so that all unions suffered from financial 
problems. Second, lacking loyalty to their unions, workers were 
unwilling to make personal sacrifices for the cause of unions. From the 
start, Kiseikai did not have sufficient influence within unions to control 
them so that unions were more or less independent. When Takano 
decided to compromise on the strike question and put aside strike as 
a last resort, he weakened the appeal of unionism to workers. 
Furthermore, his failure to embrace strikes as a direct way of higher 
wages and better working conditions enabled radicalists to capitalize on 
successful strikes. Thus the precarious position of moderate unionists 
failed to persuade workers to stand firm behind their unions.
 The defeat of the factory act brought a drasticdecline in the 
22 Marsland (1989: 93).
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membership as well as the withdrawal of support from the Social Policy 
School. In fact, Takano left his leadership position and put Katayama in 
charge of the movement. Katayama no longer advocated the harmony 
as the police harassment and the bureaucrat arrogance antagonized hi
m.23 His disposition toward socialism was even more strengthened by 
the Peace Police Act of 1900. Takano attempted to win over the 
Japanese government by showing how unionism could benefit an entire 
nation and enhance economic growth. Basically the government 
regarded labor movement as a possible obstacle to the government’s 
industrial policy. The Peace Police Act was a product of such a distrus
t.24 It was a deadly blow to the young labor movement in that the next 
organized labor movement emerged some 12 years later. 
THE MEIJI ERA 2: LABOR POLICY EMERGING AS A SOCIAL 
POLICY, PRE-WORLD WAR I
In spite of the convergence between business interest and the 
governmental aversion to organized labor, the proponents of factory 
legislation within bureaucracy increasingly supplemented their 
economic growth argument with social implication of labor policy, 
especially in the Home Ministry. One outstanding high civil servant is 
Goto Shimpei who was educated in Germany and an outspoken 
admirer of Bismarck’s “state socialism.” As a chief of the Bureau of 
Health and Sanitation, he and his staff investigated the advanced social 
policies of Europe. They also proposed for a workers’ sickness insurance 
law, which was not approved by the Home Ministry within which the 
Bureau of Health Sanitation existed. Later Bureau officials focused on 
23 Marsland (1989: 112-5). Katayama’s extreme militancy created division within the 
movement and expulsion from the Social Policy School.
24 Marsland (1989: 136-7). Article 17: “No one shall commit violence or threaten others 
or publicly slander others for the purposes of the following paragraphs, or tempt and 
incite others for the purpose of paragraph two below: 1) In order to let others join, or 
prevent others from joining an organization which aims at collective action concerning 
conditions of work or remuneration, 2) In order to let the employer discharge workers, 
or to let him reject an application for work or to let a worker refuse an offer of 
employment with a view to organizing a lockout or strike, 3) In order to compel the 
other party to agree to conditions of remuneration.” Article 30: “Those who violate 
Article 17 shall be liable to a heavy imprisonment of 1 to 6 months and in addition a 
fine of from 3 to 30 yen. The same shall apply to those who commit violence on, 
threaten, or publicly slander persons who have not joined the employer in a lockout or 
the union in a strike.” 
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the implementation of a factory law to protect the health of workers.
Their efforts bore a little fruit in 1900 when the government 
established a temporary Factory Survey Office within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce. The Survey Office recruited social policy 
experts from within, the Home Ministry as well as prominent outside 
reformers such as Professor Kuwata Kumazo of the Social Policy 
Association and a journalist named Yokoyama Gennosuke. The official 
labor survey released in 1903 highlighted the social problem of child 
labor. It disclosed the widespread employment of children of age six or 
seven. While the Government was committed to creating an educated 
citizenry, such a disclosure brought frustration to the officials.25 The 
survey also revealed the abominable work conditions in textile 
manufacturers and the consequent spread of tuberculosis throughout 
the factories and the country sides when sick girls returned to their 
village home.
The problems of workers were pressed into a social question as they 
were perceived to threat the health of the whole nation. The Bureau’s 
health issue was substantiated by the Central Health and Sanitation 
Council, an advisory board of physicians and health officials which 
chaired the army’s surgeon general. The Council warned the 
government of an ‘inverse relation between the number of qualified 
conscripts and the development of commerce and industry.’26 Aftermath 
of the Russo-Japanese War strengthened such a concern. As the victory 
of Japan over Russia raised her status in the world community and 
certainly in northeast Asia, Japan was determined to maintain her 
hegemonic position. The experience of the war contributed to the 
unification of the Japanese people.27 It was natural that the Japanese 
military leaders dealt with higher standards in public health as a matter 
of national defense. The public health issue played a decisive role in 
uniting the government behind a factory bill.
In 1909, the second Katsura cabinet presented the new factory 
legislation to the Diet, which faced strong opposition from business 
25 Garon (1987: 27). In an effort to raise the literacy level, the government extended 
compulsory education to six years in 1907. 
26 Graon (1987: 28). Evidence of the detrimental effects of factory work on the nation’s 
military strength has been mounting since 1894. 
27 Ayusawa (1966: 89-90). The author exalted that it was the first non-white nation’s 
victory over a renowned European power. He argued further that the spur of 
nationalism, a by-product of the victory of the Russo-Japanese War, later wielded its 
ideological influence to lead Japan into ‘fateful adventures.’ 
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associations and their supporters in the Seiyukai party. Although the 
parties were rarely engaged in direct framing of the factory legislation, 
their positions still affected the legislative outcomes. Two major political 
groupings dominated the Diet. In 1900, Ito Hirobumi and Saionji 
Kimmochi collaborated with the conservative group to found the Rikken 
Seiyukai, Constitutional Association of Political Friends. Its opponents 
remained fragmented: the Rikken Kokuminto, Constitutional People’s 
Party; the Chuo, Central Club. Gradually these anti-Seiyukai forces 
gathered around Katsura Taro, Saionji’s oligarchic rival.28 In 1913, 
Rikken Doshikai, Constitutional Association of Friends was organized. 
The pattern of political competition finally shifted to two-party rivalry.29 
Given the franchise restricted to a three percent of the total 
population, landlords, merchants, and industrialists dominated the 
electorate as well as the core of parties and bureaucrats as seen in Table 
4. For instance, when the repressive Peace police Act was presented, 
there was barely any debate over Article 17. Nor did any party attempt 
to revise the controversial clauses for a decade. The social background 
of the politicians and the bureaucrats could be a reason behind this 
overwhelming consensus on the maintenance of law and order.
However, there existed a noticeable disagreement over the method to 
secure social stability. The Seiyukai-backed cabinets consistently opposed 
to factory legislation others because such a law would result in a 
depression in industry. As the majority party in the House of 
Representatives, the Seiyukai blocked the Katsura’s first factory draft in 
1910. When it was reintroduced the following year, the government had 
to postpone implementation of the ban on night work by women and 
children for fifteen years. This revised bill was further weakened by 
restricting application to factories hiring at least fifteen workers, not ten 
workers as in an original draft. Even after the Factory Law was enacted 
in 1911, the Seiyukai along with business organizations, particularly the 
Cotton Spinning Federation, lobbied to temporize the implementation 
for five years.30 The Seiyukai leaders refused to take the government’s 
responsibility to lessen social problems like labor relations. The party’s 
28 Beasley (1990: 135); Garon (1987: 34). In the process of bringing the Genro under 
control, Katsura alienated himself from everyone. Taking advantage of Katsura’s failure, 
the Seiyukai launched violent attacks on him in the Diet and succeeded in forcing 
Katsura to resign. 
29 Later in 1916, the Doshikai absorbed another small party and was renamed the 
Kenseikai, Association for Constitutional Government.
30 Gordon (1989: 56). 
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TABLE 4. SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF PROMINENT HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS, 1896~1947
Source: Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor in Modern Japan, p. 79.
* The sample is confined to those born after 1871 whose fathers’ occupations are clearly 
known.
president, Hara Takashi, expressed this laissez-faire political economy 
when he commented that the burden of poor relief lay with individuals.
The rival Doshikai supported a positive social policy and criticized the 
watered-down version of the Factory Law for protecting capitalists, not 
women and children. The party’s greater support toward labor policy 
was based on two political leadership groups. One was veteran liberal 
politicians associated with the Kokuminto, the Doshikai’s forerunner. This 
group led a movement to institute a parliamentary system against the 
Meiji oligarchy. The best known was Shimada Yokoyama who as 
father’s occupation number of bureaucrats percent
top government officials 49 8.7
other government officials 31 5.5
judges and procurators 17 3.0
professors in gov’t schools 25 4.4
public employees 28 5.0
government & public(subtotal) 150 26.7
military men 25 4.4




company staff 14 2.5
Diet members 20 3.6
doctors & lawyers 36 6.4
teachers 18 3.2
Shinto & Buddhist priests 10 1.8
nobles 12 2.1
artisans & workers 15 2.7
31 5.5
total 562 100.0
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president of the Mainich shimbun published Yokoyama Gennosuke’s 
revelations about Japan’s lower class in 1899. The young Christian 
liberals were included such as Nagai Ryutaro and Uchigasaki 
Sakusaburo, the Kenseikai’s leading force behind labor legislation in the 
1920s. The other group was reformist ex-bureaucrats who promoted the 
Factory Law under the Katsura’s cabinet. Goto Shimpei, Oura Kanetake, 
and Wakasuki Reijiro all entered the Doshikai at Katsura’s request. With 
their administrative experience, these ex-bureaucrats provided the 
Doshikai with a firmer programmatic base.31 However, social reformism 
within the Doshikai was toned down to the demands of the business 
community. Social legislation itself was supposed to supplement the 
much claimed paternal welfare measures provided by employers. The 
reformers still refused the right of the poor to public assistance. Instead, 
they promoted poor-relief campaigns out of private philanthropy. Thus, 
they perceived that the protective social policy could substitute for 
workers’ organization.
Compared with the entrepreneurs of the Restoration period, the new 
management modernizers maintained that the Japanese unique 
employment relations were compatible with the law of supply and 
demand in the labor market. The old employers used to blame high 
labor turnover on the wickedness of the workers due to their ignorance 
about the link between labor shortage and labor mobility. The 
management modernizers went through their teens and early adulthood 
after the Meiji Restoration so that almost all of them were educated in 
modern institutions. Moreover, most of them traveled to the West to 
study or for business purposes. These factors contributed to their 
divergence from the old generation. Table 5 lists the ‘managerial 
generation’ of the modern capitalists. Whatever the motives were for 
these modern capitalists, they had a consensus on the compatibility of 
high wages and large profits. From the defeat of the first factory bill in 
1898 to the implementation of the second factory bill in 1916, the 
qualities of employers improved and saw no contradiction between 
paternalism and the modern management such as creating new 
incentives with higher wages and better work conditions.32 
31 Garon (1989: 38). Soon after Katsura’s death, those who served him left the Doshikai. 
The party leadership passed to Goto’s rival, Kato Takaaki who was a career diplomat and 
three-tie foreign minister. 
32 Large (1981: 9). By 1911, these modern capitalists recognized that a factory law 
would not necessarily undermine the goal of paternalistic relations in employment 
relations. However, the irony was that the Meiji labor movement became too closely 
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TABLE 5. MODERNIZERS OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE MEIJI JAPAN
Source: Taira, Koji. “Factory Legislation and Management Modernization during Japan’s 
Industrialization, 1896~1916.” Business History review 44, p. 98.
As the industrialists were undergoing the cognitive modernization, so 
were the workers in an ever expanding industrial production. First, this 
expansion yielded a growing number of wage laborers.33 Second, the 
expansion of industry resulted in the expansion of cities and of 
commerce. Consequently, the size of the urban petite bourgeoisie such 
as retail shop owners, wholesale enterprises and small factoryowners 
increased. They lived in the same neighborhoods as the wage laborers. 
These men paid taxes, yet a small proportion of them were eligible to 
vote. As taxation without ample representation began to irritate these 
men, they shared political attitudes of suspicion and opposition to the 
government. Third, the wage laborers increasingly became literate 
through higher education. The more literate workers were assets to the 
leaders of the organized labor because communication between them 
was more effective. 
The Russo-Japanese War brought the cost of war as well as nationalist 
enthusiasm to the Japanese laymen. First, the tax burden on city 
associated with radicalism to fit in smoothly with the modern managers.
33 Gordon (1989: 20). In fact, the industrial work force doubled in size between 1900 
and 1914, from around 400,000 to 853,000. 
name firm birth & death education culture contact
Heigoro Shoda Mitsubishi 1847~1922 Keio Gijuku Western tour
Teiichi Sakuma Shueisha 1848~1898 Confusion schools Christian
Hikojiro Nakamigawa Mitsui 1854~1901 Keio & England 4 yrs. in England
Tsurukichi Hatano Gunze Silk 1857~1918 secondary in Kyoto Christian
Takuma Dan Mitsui 1858~1934 M.I.T. life in the U.S.
Toyoji Wada  Fuji Cotton 1861~1924 Keio & U.S. life in the U.S.
Masaya Suzuki Sumitomo 1863-1922 Tokyo University Western tour
Sanji Muto Kanegafuchi Cotton 1867~1934 Keio & U.S. life in the U.S.
Aizo Soma Nakamuraya 1870~1954 Waseda University Christian
Tsunesaburo Suzuki Nikko Copper 1873~1940 Keio & Harvard life in the U.S.
Koyata Iwasaki Mitsubishi 1879~1945 Cambridge Univ. life in England
Magosaburo Ohara Kurashiki Cotton 1880~1943 Waseda University Christian
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TABLE 6. WAGE LABOR BY SECTOR, MINAMI KATSUSHIKA COUNTRY, 1911~1930b
sector
1911 1919a 1924 1930
number percent number percent number percent number percent
textiles 15,000 83 22,200 60 20,100 55 12,900 42
metal mach 9,800 5 7,000 18 7,100 19 7,100 25
chemical 12,000 7 6,000 16 6,000 16 6,900 22
other 9,900 5 2,000 6 3,500 10 3,300 11
Source: Gordon, Andrew. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, p. 88. 
a. The 1919 data include factories with fewer than five workers, thus the figures are slightly 
inflated. 
b. All the other data are for factories of five or more workers. 
dwellers increased due to the war bonds with which the government 
financed the War. Besides, special sales taxes were imposed on sugar, 
food oil, salt, tobacco, wool, soy and sake.34 Naturally, the tax question 
became a major concern of the urban residents. Second, the imperial 
expansion stimulated growth in heavy industry which had a tradition 
of protest over wage and work conditions. This trend concurred with 
the proportional decline in textile industry which lacked participation in 
the organized labor movement as seen in Table 6. The shift in the 
composition implicated the increasing intensity of the protest. Third, 
with higher education, factory workers were a part of urban political 
culture which laid claim to the political status and rights as a human 
entity. As the commitment and sacrifice of the people made the imperial 
expansion possible, the wishes of the people should be respected in the 
political process. In this context, the war rallies were seen as political 
gatherings as seen in Table 7.
These popular assemblies were fully taken advantage of by the 
proponents of the popular rights cause. Some of these wage laborer and 
the urban poor eventually formed a political force independent of the 
bourgeois party movement. Having gone through the period of 
submersion for a decade after the disintegration of the Kiseikai, the labor 
movement started in an atmosphere of ‘apprehension and insecurity.’35 
Suzuki Bunji founded the Yuaikai along with five machinists, two 
electricians, three street sprinklers, one tatami maker, one milkman, and 
34 Gordon (1989: 23). The proportion of state revenue raised by special sales taxes 
double from 6.5 percent before the war to 12.6 percent in 1907. 
35 Large (1981: 12). 
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TABLE 7. POLITICAL ASSEMBLIES, 1885~1919a
Source: Gordon, Andrew. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, p. 343.
a. 1883~84 figures are dropped for a comparison. Total assemblies are 170 and average, 85.
b. All figure prior to 1900 are for “political assemblies.”
c. Figures from 1900 on are for “assemblies requiring permit.” The appellation is believed to 
be changed due to the Public Peace Police Act adopted in 1900.
one lacquerware worker in the midst of the national mourning of the 
death of Emperor Meiji. In order to evade the governmental crackdown, 
he made the new organization resemble a brotherly mutual-aid group 
for workers. The name, Yuaikai, the Friendly Society, conveyed such 
efforts36. The Yuaikai platform adopted at its first meeting hardly 
resembled a labor manifesto.
1. We will strive to reach the goal of mutual aid in friendship and 
cooperation with one another.
2. We will strive to enlighten ourselves, cultivate virtue, and advance 
our skills, in accordance with the ideals of society.
3. We will strive to improve our status with sound programs, 
depending upon the strength of cooperation.
In so doing, the Yuaikai tried hard to gain public acceptance as a 
moderated, nonpolitical labor organization seeking to serve the national 
interest by enhancing the life of workers. Suzuki started the movement 
out of Christian humanitarianism whose primary mission was to 
develop and promote labor unions. He felt it urgent that the working 
class should develop a class consciousness, that is, a sense of common 
36 Large (1981: 11). Suzuki explained that ‘Friendly Society’ originated from the British 
Friendly Societies. They were workers’ mutual-aid organizations in order for trade unions 
to escape the prohibition when trade unions were illegal. 
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interest and obligation to fellow workers. In due time, he planned to 
convert a mutual-aid society into a pure labor union movement.37 
The Yuaikai received support from the Christian church and the Japan 
Social Policy Association. The link to the Association helped Suzuki 
apply social reformist principles to the Yuaikai programs. According to 
the social reformism, capitalism brought Japan not only wealth and 
power, but also the capitalist system produced hardship to workers. The 
grievances of workers against capitalists might turn violent, thus 
threatening the continuous progress in Japan. According to Professor 
Kuwata Kumazo of Tokyo Imperial University, solutions to these social 
problems could be found in social reformism as an alternative to 
laissez-faire or socialism.38 Social policies based on social reformism 
were intended to eliminate the seeds of social strife and strengthen the 
political structure. In this context, Suzuki started the Yuaikai, promising 
to pursue reforms on behalf of the workers. The Yuaikai, unlike the 
Kiseikai, succeeded in its appeal to the workers with its commitment to 
improving the lot of workers.39 
By June 1913, the Yuaikai expanded from afifteen-member 
organization into one with 1,295 members. By the end of 1915, the 
membership grew to be 7,000 and by April 1917, it claimed more than 
20,000 members.40 One key to this growth was the resourcefulness of its 
leaders. Suzuki, a graduate of the law faculty at the Tokyo Imperial 
University, proved to be adept at enlisting the aid of able men as 
organization leaders and of prominent industrialists such as Hirano 
Ryosuke, owner of the Hirano Ironworks Company, Shinzo Yoshio, 
Director of the Industrial Section of Tokyo Electric Company, and Oe 
Futo, President of the Oe Printing company. Suzuki also used the 
advisors and counselors to educate Yuaikai members.41 By enlisting the 
37 Large (1981: 17). 
38 Large (1972: 20). Kuwata claimed that there were three types of social policies. First, 
social policies by the state such as a factory law and labor insurance law. Second, social 
policies by charity such as the programs of the Salvation Army. Third, social policies by 
a group of individuals such as social reformist labor unions.
39 Gordon (1991: 98-9). As the Yuaikai was geared toward social policy reform, its 
simple promise of recognition and respect bolstered the position of organizers as 
community leaders. For instance, the union magazines listed all new members. All 
members were welcome to take the stage at union gatherings.
40 Large (1981: 18). 
41 Large (1972: 30). The advisors included Professor Kuwata Kumazo, Ogawa 
Shingejiro, an adviser to the Home Ministry on prison affairs, and Soeda Juichi, President 
of the Industrial Bank of Japan. Those scholars from the Social Policy Association served 
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services of the prominent, Suzuki attempted to convey an impression 
that the Yuaikaiwas a social reformist group willing to work for 
progressive changes within the framework of the present structure.
 In addition, the attitude toward labor relations became flexible in 
this period. Although paternalism remained the predominant approach 
to employment relations, many employers were willing to innovate their 
factories, even to grant concessions on workers’ right to form a mild 
union for the sake of harmony with workers. The politicians, despite 
their hesitation to accept the workers’ right to voice their opinion, did 
manage to express their concern with wage laborers and identify the 
labor relations as social rather than economic problems. Thus, the 
Factory Law was finally approved in 1911 although its implementation 
was delayed until 1916. But most of all, the growth of the labor 
movement was facilitated by the World War I. Industrial boom and its 
consequent inflation intensified the perceived gap between workers’ real 
wages and the nation’s prosperity. The sentiments of relative 
deprivation lay behind the unprecedented surge of labor disputes and 
strikes in the World War I period.42 
THE TAISHO DEMOCRACY: IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY
Japanese industries experienced an enormous boom from orders made 
by the Allied powers and the former Asian markets of the belligerents 
in spite of Japan’s limited role in the World War I.43 Industrial 
expansion, disproportionately concentrated on heavy industry, doubled 
the number of workers from 950,000 in 1914 to 1,612,000 in 1919. In the 
midst of wartime inflation and the high demand for skilled labor, more 
and more men resorted to strikes in order to win higher wages. This 
surge in strikes coincided with another local detrimental popular unrest, 
the rice riot of 1918, as seen in Table 8.44 Involvement of the Yuaikai 
the Yuaikaias counselors. These included Takano Iwasaburo, Horie Kiichi, Adachi Kenzo, 
and Kanda Koichi.
42 Large (1972: 19). One labor activist named Kagawa Toyohiko remarked that ‘while 
the capitalists have the right to play and eat wrapped in silk kimonos, the workers who 
toil naked should have the same right.’
43 Ayusawa (1966: 118). During the World War I, 65 million men were mobilized. 
Japanese contribution was 800,000 while the United States sent 4.35 million men and 
France, 8.41 million men. The United States had 126,000 deaths and France, 1.364 million 
deaths while 300 Japanese men were killed.
44 Garon (1987: 40-41). The first disturbance occurred in late July 1918 in a Toyama 
fishing village, where women resisted the shipment of scarce rice to Osaka. Rioting broke 
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TABLE 8. INDUSTRIAL STRIKES AND RICE PRICES, JULY 1918-DECEMBER 1919
Source: Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor in Modern Japan, p. 40.
branches in the major strikes irritated the conservative Terauchi 
government as well as industrialists. Thus industrialists dismissed 
Yuaikai members while the government arrested strikers. In spite of 
these dismissals and dissolutions, the Yuaikai attracted record numbers 
of new members and a consequent increase in numbers of unions as 
seen in Table 9.
Another important factor aiding the rise of organized labor was the 
international influences. Japan attended the Paris Peace Conference as 
the only non-Western nation as one of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers. The Conference appointed “Commission for 
International Labor Legislation” and authorized the creation of the 
International Labor Organization, to which ILO members agreed to send 
a representative of the nation's workers. In a changing world, Japan as 
a great power was expected to stand ‘at the dawn of a new democratic 
age.’ In accordance with the world trend, the Kenseikai introduced a bill 
demanding for a revision of the Public Peace Police Act in order to 
broaden workers’ rights to strike and form unions. This effort was in 
part instigated by Japan’s enthusiasm to insert a racial-equality clause 
into the Covenant of the League of Nations. Although the proposed 
out throughout Japan and angry consumers looted the shops of rice merchants. Among 
the protesters were included factory workers and miners on strikes for better pay. These 
demonstrations rarely demanded political change, yet the alarmed Terauchi government 
dispatched troops to put down riots. 
1918 # of strikes 
rice price 
(yen/koku)
1919 # of strikes
rice price 
(yen/koku)
July 42 30.39 April 15 39.19
Aug 108 38.70 May 16 42.40
Sep 47 38.23 June 44 44.10
Oct 34 43.91 July 106 47.85
Nov 12 39.77 Aug 115 49.56
Dec 9 40.58 Sep 38 51.26
1919 Jan 15 40.94 Oct 38 51.06
1919 Feb 19 40.86 Nov 46 52.20
1919 Mar 15 37.30 Dec 30 53.87
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TABLE 9. SPREAD OF TRADE UNIONS AND LABOR DISPUTES, 1911~30
Source: Ayusawa, Iwao F. A History of Labor in Modern Japan, p. 154.
* Figures for union membership from 1911~1920 are not available.
revision failed to pass in the Lower House due to the majority of the 
Seiyukai, the Kenseikai did believe genuinely that Japan was beginning to 
face a Western-style crisis in social relations. Without doubt, the 
organized labor movement benefited tremendously from such 
contemporary perception of Japan’s position in a changing world.
The Seiyukai and Kenseikai/ Minseito parties agreed on a basic ideological 
framework in that a parliamentary government with a certain degree of 
year
unions disputes
number membership number participants
1911 32 n.a. 22 2,100
1912 37 n.a. 49 5,736
1913 43 n.a. 47 5,242
1914 49 n.a. 50 6,904
1915 53 n.a. 64 7,852
1916 66 n.a. 108 8,418
1917 80 n.a. 389 57,309
1918 91 n.a. 417 66,457
1919 162 n.a. 497 335,225
1920 273 n.a. 282 127,491
1921 300 103,412 246 170,889
1922 387 137,381 250 85,909
1923 432 125,551 290 68,814
1924 449 175,454 333 94,047
1925 490 234,000 293 89,387
1926 488 284,749 495 127,491
1927 505 309,493 383 103,350
1928 501 308,900 393 101,893
1929 630 330,985 576 172,144
1930 712 354,312 907 191,834
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popular participation would best serve Japan’s political stability and 
economic growth as well as party's interest in contesting for power. The 
politicians became convinced that a unilateral bureaucratic rule or a 
simple repression combined with paternalism could no longer warrant 
such causes. However, two parties showed their divergence on the 
practical issue of how much popular participation would guarantee the 
maintenance of social order. First of all, they disagreed over whether 
Japan should maintain a democracy of the propertied, or expand the 
franchise to all men, even including women, as seen in Table 10.45 
Second battle was over the labor union bills, a much more heated issue 
than the universal suffrage. Both parties explored their policy 
implementation when they alternated power between 1918 and 1932. 
The Seiyukai produced a conservative version of imperial democracy 
while the Kenseikai/ Minseito produced a liberal version of imperial 
democracy.
TABLE 10. CAREER AFTER RETIREMENT FROM THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVE HOME 
MINISTRY VS. AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE/INDUSTRY MINISTRY, 1918~31
Source: Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor, p. 81.
a. Home Ministry retirees typically became colonial administrators or ministers in nonparty 
cabinets. Former vice-ministers of Agriculture and Commerce Ministry occasionally headed 
government- sponsored associations of agricultural cooperatives or fishermen.
b. Two, if one includes Tanaka Ryuzo, who was also managing director of Fujita Mining.
45 Gordon (1989: 57). In fact, the shadowy policy division between the Seiyukai and the 
Doshikai/ Kenseikai/ Minseito had appeared in the process of the factory law struggle 
although anti-Seiyukaiforces remained fragmented until many of them joined in the 
Doshikai at Katsura’s request. Along with the bureaucratic division in social policy 
between the Home Ministry and the Justice Ministry, the party division contributed to 
elite pluralism on the labor union issue in the 1920s. Interestingly, the Agriculture and 
Commerce Ministry, at first, sided with the Doshikai, but changed its side to the Seiyukaiin 
the 1920s as its primary practitioners in the economic world were managers of large 
heavy industry. Their different attitudes toward business reflected the kind of jobs sought 
after their retirement as seen in Table 10. 
career
Home Ministry (vice-ministers 
& Social Bureau directors)
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry
(v-m & Industrial Bureau chiefs)
big business 0 5 (50%)
higher admin postsa 6 (50%) 4 (40%)
party activists 5 (42%) 1 (10%)b
House of Peers 1 (8%) 0
total 12 (100%) 10(100%)
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The Seiyukai was in power from 1918 to 1922, from 1927 to 1929, and 
from 1931 to 1932. Hara Takashi’s cabinet introduced several new social 
policies under the direction of Tokonami Takejiro, Minister of the 
Home, all aiming to restore social order and harmony. Under the 
cabinet of Hara, Japan was committed to the participation in the 
International Labor Organization. Hara reinterpreted the anti-strike, 
anti-union clauses of the Public Peace Police Law by giving directions 
to local police to tolerate peaceful unions and strikes. Accordingly, 
arrests made under the law decreases from 1919 as seen in Table 11.
Tokonami was influential in founding the Kyochokai, Harmonization 
Society, which was an officially supported brain trust studying social 
problems such as labor-capital conflict. It played a crucial role in 
coordinating labor policies of the bureaucracy and the business. In order 
to deal with unemployment and other social problems, the Home 
Ministry created a Social Bureau in 1922. When the first serious 
discussions of a union law occurred, Hara and the Seiyukai eventually 
TABLE 11. STRIKE-RELATED ARRESTS UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE POLICE 
REGULATIONS, 1914~26
Source: Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor, p. 252.
a. Figures for 1924~26 include slowdowns.
b. Other clauses include the application of the ‘instigation and incitement’ clause and Article 
17, in general, in tandem with other laws.
year strike participants total arrests Article 17 instigation other clausesb other charges
1914 7,904 32 18 0 14
1915 7,852 65 9 55 1
1916 8,413 59 30 10 19
1917 57,309 174 104 34 36
1918 66,457 1,965 159 197 1,609
1919 63,137 536 58 61 417
1920 36,371 378 131 54 193
1921 58,225 634 16 68 550
1922 41,503 213 6 37 170
1923 36,259 237 11 10 216
1924a 54,526 383 26 54 303
1925a 40,742 331 0 17 314
1926a 67,234 993 0 0 993
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rejected the union legislation and instead sought to encourage 
industrialists to solve their employment problems with ‘vertical 
company unions’ and ‘works councils.’46 Tokonami was a major figure 
in drafting the Works Council Bill in 1919, which Hara withdrew in the 
face of criticism from industrialists appalled by any compulsory 
program. Such efforts were intended to calm labor unrest without 
recognizing an independent labor organization. Although the Bill was 
never enacted, the conservative Seiyukai came to a belief that positive 
policies were crucial in taming aggressive labor and that simple 
repression would never do the job.
The new orientation of the Hara government was even extended to 
other social policies. For instance, a special committee was set up in the 
Agricultural Ministry to investigate reform of tenant farming. The result 
was a draft establishing rights to tenancy, yet the Seiyukai temporized 
the draft, which provoked fierce landlord opposition. Another instance 
involved a limited reform of the prohibition on women's participation 
in political assemblies, though not associations. The major change 
involved the extension of legal participation in politics. Hara supported 
a lowered property tax qualification for suffrage, but he opposed 
universal suffrage for males in 1919. The shortcomings of the 
conservative liberalism manifested themselves in the refusal of rights in 
the part of the propertyless. This was the democracy for the landed elite 
and the bourgeoisie which encouraged corporate paternalism and 
ensured it by repressing any independent movement. Preoccupied with 
the prosecution of the extreme radicalism, the conservative conception 
of imperial democracy ignored the social causes behind the outbreak of 
aggressive manifestation of social problems.
The conservative version of imperial democracy articulated by Hara 
and Tokonami yielded to a more liberal framework of elite social policies 
from 1924 on. After witnessing the growing labor militancy, the 
Kenseikai became convinced that only a union law and protective 
legislation could reduce the sources of radicalism among workers.47 The 
46 Gordon (1989: 58). Hara’s government promised to provide a favorable context by 
repressing any radical union efforts which went beyond the company’ union framework. 
47 Garon (1987: 70). In the spring of 1920, the Japanese economy began to experience 
a post war recession and growing unemployment. As the bargaining position of 
organized labor declined, dismissals and wage reductions were widespread. Although the 
number of strikes decreased during this period, the strikes themselves became longer, 
larger, and more violent. In the meantime, many union leaders became skeptical of 
working with the bourgeois parties. Increasingly, radical components grew within the 
324 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY
‘new men’, middle-level bureaucrats in the Home Ministry’s Social 
Bureau promoted a wide array of political and social reforms. They 
aimed to incorporate labor and stabilize social order through remedial 
legislation such as national health insurance, a stronger factory law, 
unemployment insurance, and a union bill. The Kato cabinet carried out 
several measures which the Hara cabinet shelved. The size of the 
bureaucracy was reduced by 20,000. Military expenditure was cut to 30 
percent of the national budget from 40 percent a few years before. The 
Tenant Dispute Mediation Law was enacted to protect tenant farmers. 
The Universal Manhood Suffrage Act gave the vote to all males over 25, 
increasing the size of the electorate from three million to thirteen 
million.48 
In spite of their opposition to all of these measures, the Seiyukai and 
the Doshikai/ Kenseikai/ Minseito shared a fundamental ground: imperial 
democracy. These party members and their bureaucratic allies agreed on 
supporting empire and the capitalist foundation. They also concurred 
that parliamentary government was desirable to secure these ends. 
Therefore, these elites had a consensus on the boundary for tolerable 
political thought and action.49 The passage of the Peace Preservation 
Law was a demarcation of the elite pluralism from the democratic 
pluralism. Organized labor, unwittingly, contributed to the adoption of 
another police regulation.
Since his two trips to the United States, Suzuki shifted his tone on the 
labor movement. Instead of harmony and cooperation between labor 
and capital, he adopted the theme of conflict. Modeled after the 
American Federation of Labors, Suzuki reorganized the Yuaikai 
headquarters. The departments were subdivided into specialized 
sections. One notable change was the establishment of a Women's 
Department and the publication of a journal, Yuai fujin, in an attempt 
to appeal to the large number of female workers. In 1917, female 
workers were given full status as regular members.50 Realizing the 
labor movement. Instead of working through the parliament, these syndicalist labor 
organizers promoted direct actions. 
48 Gordon (1989: 141). Women’s groups pressed for the right of political association, 
the right to vote and the right to hold regional or local public office. Several legislations 
were submitted to the Diet, in which the Lower House approved them, but the House 
of Peers kept opposed to the passage of the legislation.
49 Gordon (1989: 142). Attack on the emperor system was a capital offense while 
repudiation of the system of private property was punishable by up to ten years in jail.
50 Large (1981: 72). 
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paucity of craft union tradition, the Yuaikai promoted trade unions, 
which would promote workers’ status as equal to that of industrialists. 
At the same time, Suzuki began to speak about conflict in labor-capital 
relations. He was in no way an advocate of violence. The usage of a 
term ‘conflict,’ however, created misunderstanding and apprehension on 
the part of industrialists and the government.
What Suzuki meant by conflict was not a class warfare nor a sabotage 
of the industry by workers, but a confrontation with the industrialists 
in the course of encouraging the development of labor unions. Unless 
the industrialists accepted workers’ right to organize, and bargain as 
equals, the workers could not be expected to remain submissive for 
long. Because of the industrialists and the government's refusal to 
recognize workers as equals, the workers themselves should initiate 
change. In fact, the reason for the growing violence in labor disputes 
resulted from the lack of the government’s commitment to the labor 
legislation. Suzuki argued that the moderate labor unions such as the 
Yuaikai could prevent many workers to fall under the influence of 
radicalists and socialists.
In essence, Suzuki was a social reformist working within the 
boundaries of the existing order. The Kenseikai’s decision to draft an 
integrated program of labor legislation concurred with Suzuki’s 
argument. Egi Tasuku, Minister of the Justice, claimed that the 
recognition of labor unions would create a legally responsible group of 
union officials who would curb their members’ tendencies toward 
reckless strikes.51 However, the instigation of conflicting relation 
between labor and capital also provoked the antagonism workers 
developed over the failed parliamentary labor legislation. To many 
industrialists, the Yuaikai was believed to lie behind the growing 
militancy of labor unions. In the latter half of 1920s and the early 1930s, 
even the minority of the industrialists sympathetic to the moderate 
labor unions shunned away. Their withdrawal of support for the legal 
labor organization accounted for the repeated defeat of the labor union 
bill in the Diet.
As industrialists underwent the struggle over the factory legislation, 
they were motivated to join hands in political battles. The most 
important group was the Japan Industrial Club dominated by zaibatsu 
firms. The Japan Association of Economic Federations was the second 
major, national business association. While the Industrial Club played a 
51 Garon (1987: 67).
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greater role on labor issues, the Economic Federations focused on 
financial matters. Both organizations represented zaibatsu interests. 
Occasionally, small and medium enterprises indicated that the majority 
would tolerate moderate trade unions. Several local industrial 
federations also supported the mild labor legislation.52 They agreed that 
the only way to bring order to a situation of hostility was by 
recognizing labor unions. Taking advantage of this division within the 
business world, the liberal Kenseikai government passed both Health 
Insurance Union Bill and the revision of the Factory Law.
Thediversity of business, bureaucracy, and the political party 
approaches to the labor issues reflected the pluralistic structure of the 
Taisho Imperial rule. However, the workers themselves had no means 
to participate directly in politics even after universal male suffrage in 
1925. The Sodomei, renamed Yuaikai, remained outside of the window 
looking in the house of politics.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMIT OF LIBERAL “ELITE DEMOCRACY” IN 
MODERN JAPAN
The failure to block the Insurance Bill and Factory Law revision 
alarmed industrialists. The Industrial Club gathered efforts to force the 
Minseito to capitulate by threatening that the union bill stood in the way 
of continued industrial support for the cabinet’s economic policies. 
Through intensive lobbying in the Diet, their effort bore a fruit in the 
House of Peers. One interesting fact was that the labor movement itself 
proved unwilling and unable to substantiate the cabinet’s liberal 
legislation. The political impotence of the organized labor resulted from 
internal disunity due to the preoccupation with ideological purity. 
While the industrialists presented a united front in the battle of the 
Diet, the labor union movement became fragmented into right-wing, 
centrist, and left-wing blocs. The Industrial Club even convinced the 
public that labor unions with their factionalism were destroying 
Japanese social order as well as industry.53 Despite the Minseito’s 
overwhelming majority in the Lower House, the union bill was defeated 
in the House of Peers as seen in Table 12.
Unlike universal manhood suffrage, the union bill failed to draw a 
52 Gordon (1989: 611). The Osaka Industrial Association and the Tokyo Federation of 
Business Associations were sympathetic to the cause of labor unions. The Electric Power 
Industry Association also showed willingness to tolerate labor unions, at least until 1930.
53 Garon (1987: 177).
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TABLE 12. ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1920~30
Source: Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor, p. 138.
widespread public support. Even the labor unions themselves could not 
convince the public that the workers’ right to organize unions was 
important. According to Garon, the fifty-ninth Diet under the 
Hamaguchi and the subsequent Wakasuki cabinets marked the end of 
the decade of liberal reform.54 In addition to the now unified 
organization of business, the National Federation of Industrial 
Organizations, the Great Depression discredited Hamaguchi's bold 
proposals on the legal recognition of labor unions. With the increasing 
incidence of rural poverty and failing small businesses, the politicians 
and the bureaucrats shifted their attention to the relief of farmers and 
shopkeepers who formed over half of the population. The liberal reform 
was further stymied by the Manchurian Incident when the Imperial 
army occupied southern Manchuria, defying the cabinet.
In conclusion, the Meiji Japan was a labor surplus economy in which 
the balance of power belonged to the owners of the scarce capital and 
land resources, not to the owners of abundant labor resources, the 
workers and the tenant farmers. Thus, their grievances were dealt with 
as an economic problem. Even the workers themselves were not 
conscious of their right to a decent human life. However, the advent of 
large-scale wars contributed to the advancement of the bargaining 
power of the workers, especially with skills in high demand. The 
tightening of labor market empowered the skilled workers in their 
demand for higher wages and better work conditions. In this context, 
the strikes and disputes were evidence of the ongoing shift in economic 
power.55 
54 Garon (1987: 184).
55 Napier (1982: 344). 
year
Kenseikai Seiyukai Seiyuhonto
seats percent seats percent seats percent
1920 110 24 278 60
1924 152 33 102 22 111 24
year Minseito Seiyukai Proletarian parties
1928 216 46 217 47 8 2
1930 273 59 147 37 5 1
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According to W. Arthur Lewis, economic development leads to the 
reallocation of rural-base workers to urban-based manufacturing sector.56 
The surplus of labor supply motivates employers to provide the 
subsistence-level wage. This low wage encourages industrialization and 
capital formation. However, there comes a turning point when the 
supply curve of labor starts to rise and competitive wage determination 
takes over. Japan had this turning point in the aftermath of the World 
War I. During this period, Japan experienced a bulge in real and 
nominal wages as well as the change in consumption patterns. This 
bulge in wages is an evidence that the labor surplus stage of Japanese 
development ended with the World War I. The changes in wages and 
consumption pattern are shown in Table 13 and Table 14.
The modern managerial industrialists managed to link higher wages 
with higher productivity and larger profit. Yet they failed to grasp the 
rights of wage laborers as being equal to theirs. In this respect, the 
Japanese middle class failed to sustain the trend toward democratization. 
Although being the prime mover of democratization, the Japanese 
middle class remained hesitant to recognize the human rights of 
workers, the propertyless. Therefore, when they did manage to start a 
truly liberal reform, they found that the external factors hindered their 
effort toward the progress of democratization. It was their hesitation that 
brought the end to the liberal democracy which they initiated.
TABLE 13. LONG TRENDS IN WAGES, 1917~1930
Source: Garon, Sheldon. The State and Labor, p. 249.
* The average wage of male and female workers in manufacturing, when 1934-36 level is put 
to 100.





nominal real nominal real
1917 41.8 54.4 1924 112.7 86.7
1918 53.7 51.9 1925 115.7 87.9
1919 79.1 57.4 1926 117.9 93.9
1920 104.5 72.6 1927 115.7 93.5
1921 106.7 80.8 1928 117.9 99.1
1922 112.7 86.7 1929 117.2 100.9
1923 109.0 84.6 1930 106.0 101.5
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TABLE 14. TRENDS IN THE COMPOSITION OF PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES 
IN PREWAR JAPAN, 1874~1940
Source: Patrick, Hugh. Japanese Industrialization, p. 38.
* The figures are percent.
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